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TREATMENT WITHOUT FACING
DISCRIMINATION
KRISTIN M. ROSHELLIt
INTRODUCTION

A woman is having a difficult time becoming pregnant, but
she desperately wants to have a child. She and her female
partner live in a rural area and seek out the only physician in
town to undergo intrauterine insemination, a fertility treatment
The
that will increase her chances of becoming pregnant.
that
because
woman
the
informs
center
physician at the fertility
of her religious beliefs, she refuses to perform intrauterine
insemination on lesbian patients. The physician recommends
that she find another provider. Should the physician be held
liable for sexual orientation discrimination under state
antidiscrimination laws, or should the physician be shielded from
liability because performing the treatment on lesbian patients is
against her religious beliefs?
Physicians who refuse to provide care based on reasons of
conscience have three potential sources of protection: (1) the First
Amendment,1 which protects actions guided by sincerely held
religious beliefs; (2) a state constitution's free exercise clause;2
and (3) statutory protection granted by state and federal

t Notes and Comments Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2010, St.
John's University School of Law; B.S.N., 2002, University of Pennsylvania;
Registered Nurse.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 See Vincent Phillip Mufioz, The OriginalMeaning of the Free Exercise Clause:
The Evidence from the FirstCongress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 1083, 1089 (2008)
(discussing the free exercise clauses in state constitutions).
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legislatures, typically called "conscience clauses."3 Historically,
state conscience clauses have shielded physicians from
discrimination by their employers when, for example, a physician
refused to perform an abortion or sterilization procedure that
violated the physician's firmly held religious or moral beliefs.4
The scope of these clauses, however, have in some states been
expanded to protect health care providers who refuse to perform
any type of health care procedure that is against the
practitioner's religious or moral beliefs and to afford the
practitioner protection from civil or criminal liability.'
The hypothetical scenario presented above demonstrates the
conflict of values that arises when a lesbian patient is refused
treatment because of her sexual orientation by a physician who
declines to treat her based on religious or moral grounds. The
scenario pits an individual's right to religious freedom against
the government's strong interest in protecting citizens from
discrimination.
These values will increasingly clash because of the changing
landscape of our society and our health care system. The number
of homosexual women seeking fertility treatments is rising due to
the increased ability of homosexuals to form civil unions, as well
as technological advancements in the field of fertility treatment
that afford more women the ability to undergo assisted
These factors, along with
reproductive technology ("ART").
a fertility specialist whose
to
choose
ability
patients' diminished
moral or religious beliefs align with their own, will increasingly
lead to frustration and tension between patients and providers
within the field of fertility medicine. The significance of this
final factor, restricted access to treatment, is due, at least in
part, to the rise of health care management organizations
("HMOs"), which restrict a patient's ability to choose a health
care provider and the increasing presence of religious-based
health care systems, such as those run by the Catholic Church,
that refuse to provide fertility treatments to homosexuals.

' See Bruce Patsner, Refusing To Treat: Are There Limits to Physician
"Conscience"Claims?, HEALTH L. PERSP., Aug. 19, 2008, at 2, http'//www.law.uh.edu/
healthlaw/perspectives/2008/(BP)%20conscience.pdf.
" See infra Part II.A (discussing the emergence of state conscience clauses).
' See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2 (2008); W. VA. CODE. § 16-30-12 (2008).
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Many physicians and religious organizations are pushing to
increase the scope of conscience clauses to protect their rights to
religious freedom and ensure that they are not subject to liability
for refusing to provide reproductive services on certain protected
classes of individuals such as lesbians. As lesbian patients begin
to recognize this movement and learn that the law does not
guarantee them access to ART,6 they are fighting back to protect
their ability to access fertility services without facing
discrimination. They are also engaging in the debate over when
and under what circumstances a physician or health care
institution should be permitted to refuse to provide fertility
services to certain classes of patients because of a conflicting
moral or religious belief.
As the debate over the scope of conscience clauses continues,
state legislatures need to reexamine their conscience clauses to
ensure that they are appropriately tailored to balance these
competing interests. This Note argues that state conscience
clauses should shield health care providers from incurring civil,
criminal, or administrative liability for blanket refusals to
perform fertility treatments on any class of patients because it
violates their religious or moral beliefs but posits that health
care providers who make a conscience refusal to perform fertility
treatments based on a patient characteristic, such as sexual
orientation, should have statutory protection only in limited
circumstances-specifically, protection should only be afforded to
practitioners who work at religiously based health care facilities
or sole practitioners who can refer patients with relative ease
and convenience to another willing practitioner.
Part I provides the background for this discussion by
highlighting important societal and healthcare developments
that have fueled this debate. Part II maps the changing scope of
state and federal conscience clauses and depicts the spectrum of
conscience clauses among the states. The standard for claiming a
moral or religious objection under these provisions is also
explored. Part III discusses a recent Supreme Court of California
case, North Coast Women's Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San
Diego County Superior Court,7 which demonstrates in a practical
sense how state courts have balanced a physician's right to
I See Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted
Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 61 (2005).

' 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).

980

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:977

religious freedom against a patient's ability to access fertility
treatment without facing sexual orientation discrimination. Part
III analyzes the United States Supreme Court standard that the
California court applied in North Coast to determine whether the
First Amendment right to freedom of religion should triumph
over a conflicting state antidiscrimination law. It also delineates
state and federal antidiscrimination laws and explores to what
extent these laws have been upheld against a First Amendment
right of religion defense in the context of other areas of law, such
as employment and property law.
Part IV discusses the
American Medical Association's ("AMA") directives on conscience
refusal and compares these standards to two state conscience
clauses: one in accord with these standards and one at odds with
them. The outcome of North Coast is discussed in the context of
these broader conscience clauses that provide health care
practitioners protection for refusing to provide any type of care
based on a religious or moral belief.
Part V makes
recommendations to state legislatures on how to craft their
conscience clauses in a manner reflective of the appropriate
balance between these two competing interests. It then applies
the proposed statute to a variety of scenarios to demonstrate its
practical application.
I.

A.

TYPES OF FERTILITY TREATMENTS, ETHICS, AND THE
SURROUNDING MEDICAL DEBATE

Medical Background

Infertility, a common medical problem that affects more than
six million Americans,' is often treated with ART and artificial
insemination. About twenty percent of infertile women seek
fertility treatment with ART,9 a field of medicine that has grown

8 See Elizabeth Weil, Breeder Reaction: Does Everybody Have the Right To Have
a Baby? And Who Should Pay When Nature Alone Doesn't Work?, MOTHER JONES,
July/Aug. 2006, at 33, 33.

9 Id. Between 1981 and 2005, approximately 177,000 infants were born in the
United States with the help of ART. Gurmankin et al., supra note 6, at 61.
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to a four-billion-dollar-a-year industry. 10 ART is defined as "all
fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are handled."1 1
An ART procedure
involve[s] surgically removing eggs from a woman's ovaries,
combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning
them to the woman's body or donating them to another woman.
[An ART procedure does not] include treatments in which only
sperm are handled (i.e., intrauterine-or artificialinsemination) or a procedure[] in which a woman takes
medicine only to stimulate
egg production without the intention
12
of having eggs retrieved.
Another common type of fertility treatment is intrauterine
insemination, which is also referred to as artificial
insemination. 3 This procedure involves the insertion of sperm
into a woman's uterus through a catheter to facilitate
fertilization. 4
1.

Medical Ethics
Lesbian women, who are part of the so-called "lesbian baby
boom"' 5 because of the increased number of lesbians who want to
bear children, are being denied fertility treatments based on
their sexual orientation even though there is no professional
ethical restriction on providing this type of treatment. 16 One
10Well,supra note 8, at 34.
" CTR.FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: HOME, http://www.cdc.gov/artl (last
visited Apr. 25, 2009).
12

Id.

13 See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL

& PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (ART) REPORT app. B (2001),
http'//www.cdc.gov/ART/ARTO1appixb.htm.
14 See id. Unlike heterosexual women who typically seek out these types of
fertility treatments only when they are infertile, cannot find a willing partner, or
lack the opportunity to mate with males, some lesbians seek out these fertility
treatments simply because they are not attracted to males. See John A. Robertson,
Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 323, 325 n.9 (2004).
15 See Paula Amato & Mary Casey Jacob, ProvidingFertility Services to Lesbian
Couples: The Lesbian Baby Boom, 2 SEXUALITY, REPROD. & MENOPAUSE 83, 83
(2004) (noting that health surveys reveal that approximately one-third to one-half of
lesbian women of childbearing age plan to become parents, presumably implying
that half of these women will try to become pregnant).
16 The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine has
declared that fertility "[pirograms should treat all requests for assisted reproduction
equally without regard to marital status or sexual orientation." The Ethics Comm. of
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study published in Fertility and Sterility in 2005 revealed that a
hypothetical lesbian candidate would be very or extremely likely
to be excluded from seventeen percent of ART programs, and a
woman without a husband or partner would be very or extremely
likely to be turned away by twenty percent of ART programs.17
Twelve countries completely ban unmarried women from
undergoing ART.'"
Additionally, ensuring access to fertility
treatment for lesbian women may be especially important
because one clinical research study has indicated that lesbian
women, as compared to heterosexual women, are almost four
times as likely to have polycystic ovary syndrome, a condition
that makes a woman more likely to miscarry and decreases her
ability to bear a child.' 9
B.

FactorsFueling the Debate

There are three main factors that have brought the current
discussion over lesbian patients accessing fertility treatment to
the forefront of debate. The first of these factors is society's
increasing acceptance of homosexual couples forming familiesan expanding number of states now allow homosexuals to form
civil unions or enter into same-sex marriages. The second factor
is the growth of religious health care systems that typically
refuse to provide any type of ART and often deny homosexuals
the limited fertility services that they do provide. The third
factor fueling this debate is the proliferation of HMOs. These
the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Access to Fertility
Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried Persons, 86 FERTILITY & STERILITY
1333, 1333 (2006).
17

Gurmankin et al., supra note 6, at 65 tbl.6. The study did not attempt to

explain the rationale for these refusals; however, it did note that regional variability
was likely, in part, due to variations in "local mores, religious beliefs, and
religiosity." Id. at 66-67.
18 See Judy E. Stern et al., Attitudes on Access to Services at Assisted
Reproductive Technology Clinics: Comparisons with Clinic Policy, 77 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 537, 537 (2002) (noting specifically that Ireland, India, and Saudi Arabia,
among nine other countries, do not allow ART treatment of unmarried women).
19See Rina Agrawal et al., Prevalence of Polycystic Ovaries and Polycystic Ovary
Syndrome in Lesbian Women Compared with Heterosexual Women, 82 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 1352, 1355 (2004). The study noted that, "women with [polycystic ovary
syndrome] may miscarry at a rate of approximately [forty percent], compared with a
[fifteen percent] rate in the general population"; however, it also noted that
"[allthough there may [sic] a higher incidence of subfertility in lesbian women
related to their [polycystic ovary syndrome], in our study, the pregnancy rates were

similar in both groups of women when matched for age." Id. at 1356.
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last two factors restrict a woman's ability to access treatment,
while the rising number of civil unions is increasing demand for
treatment.
1.

Civil Unions and Same-Sex Marriages
The first factor, the increasing number of states granting
same-sex couples the same or similar state-recognized rights as
married couples,2" provides same-sex couples greater family
stability and security.2 This will likely encourage more same-sex
couples to want children. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa,
Vermont, and New Hampshire now allow same-sex marriages,
and New Jersey allows civil unions.2 2 States that recognize
domestic partnerships, which grant homosexual couples many of
the same state rights as married couples, now include California,
23
Oregon, and Nevada.
2.

Religious Health Care Systems
The second factor, one which restricts a lesbian's access to
fertility treatment, is the proliferation of religiously controlled
hospital systems that provide limited fertility services. Many of
these systems are owned by the Catholic Church and refuse to
provide ART to any patient 24 and specifically forbid performing
artificial insemination on homosexuals.25
The Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services guides the

20

See

NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SAME SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL

UNIONS AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.

htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2009).
21 See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 415, 474
(Conn. 2008)
(legalizing same-sex marriage in Connecticut and noting that "[a] primary reason
why many same sex couples wish to marry is so that their children can feel secure in
knowing that their parents' relationships are as valid and as valued as the marital
relationships of their friends' parents.").
22 See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SAME SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL
UNIONS, AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex

.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010). The District of Columbia has also passed a same
sex marriage law, which is now under Congressional review. Id.
2 Id.
24 ART

is banned under Catholic directives because it is considered a "technique

used to achieve extra-corporeal conception." See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS,

ETHICAL

AND RELIGIOUS

DIRECTIVES

FOR CATHOLIC

HEALTH

CARE

SERVICES (4th ed. 2001) (Directive No. 41), available at www.usccb.org/bishops/

directives.shtml.
25 See id. (directives Nos. 40, 41).
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care rendered at Catholic health care systems.2 6 These directives
provide, in part, that artificial insemination using sperm from a
non-spouse donor is never acceptable, and artificial insemination
from a spouse should not be performed when it "separates
procreation from the marital act in its unitive significance,"27
meaning that the Catholic Church does not condone artificial
insemination between spouses "if the sample is obtained and
handled by non-licit means ([a] masturbated specimen)." 28 It
does, however, condone the collection of sperm for use in artificial
insemination if the sperm is obtained from a perforated condom
after normal intercourse between a husband and a wife.29
Catholic health care institutions that refuse to provide these
fertility treatments have an ever-increasing presence in health
care. Catholic institutions represent the largest group of nonprofit hospitals in the United States." From 1990 to 1998, there
were 127 mergers and affiliations between Catholic and nonCatholic hospitals. 31
Approximately half of these mergers
eliminated all or some reproductive health services. 2 In 1998,
ninety-one Catholic hospitals were sole providers for health care
services, meaning the hospital was the only hospital in the

26 See generally id. (pt. 4, para. 1) (noting that "[tihe Church's commitment to
human dignity inspires an abiding concern for the sanctity of human life from its
very beginning" and that "[tihe Church cannot approve medical practices that
undermine the biological, psychological, and moral bonds on which the strength of
marriage and the family depends.").
21 Id.(directives Nos. 40, 41).

28 U.S.

CONFERENCE

OF CATHOLIC

BISHOPS,

REPRODUCTIVE

TECHNOLOGY

& TREATMENT OF INFERTILITY) GUIDELINES FOR CATHOLIC
COUPLES(l) (1999), http:l/www.usccb.orglprolife/issues/nfp/treatment.htm.
29 See id.
30 Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe Is Not Enough: When
Religion ControlsHealthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725, 729-30 (2004).
(EVALUATION

31

LIz BUCAR, CAUTION: CATHOLIC HEALTH RESTRICTIONS MAY BE HAZARDOUS

YOUR HEALTH (1999), http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/topics/healthcare/
see also Martha Minow,
documents/1998cautioncatholichealthrestrictions.pdf;
Partners,Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit
and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1070-71 (2000)
(explaining that mergers between Catholic and non-religious hospitals often result
in a trade-off: It permits some communities to retain basic health services that were
in financial jeopardy, but it sacrifices a significant portion of their reproductive
health services).
32 Minow, supra note 31, at 1070-71.
TO
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county."
By 2004, Catholic health care systems controlled
34
of all hospital beds in the United States.
percent
twenty
Other religions, such as Islam, forbid the use of fertility
treatments on lesbian patients, but unlike the Catholic Church,
they do not own a commanding control of our health care
system.35 Individual practitioners who follow Islam and hold
moral objections to performing fertility treatment on lesbians do,
however, create another barrier for lesbians seeking fertility
treatment.
3.

The Proliferation of Health Maintenance Organizations

The third factor fueling this debate is the proliferation of
managed care organizations-a factor that restricts patient
autonomy by limiting their ability to choose a health care
provider. 36
A limited choice of health care providers will
"compound the current tensions between religious autonomy in
providing health care and patient choice of provider and
treatment."37 As one commentator has noted, "[tihe issue of
hospital provider choice is central to the balance of patient rights
and organizational imperatives where religiously affiliated
hospitals enter into participatory contractual arrangements with
general service [health maintenance organizations] as medical
service providers."38

33 BUCAR, supra note 31.
31 See Fogel, supra note 30, at 730.
35 Catholicism and Islam are at least

two religions that formally reject the use of
fertility treatment for homosexuals. See Reza Omani Samani et al., Access to
Fertility Treatments for Homosexual and UnmarriedPersons, Through IranianLaw
and Islamic Perspective, 1 IRANIAN J. FERTILITY & STERILITY 127, 130 (2007)
(asserting that under Islam, "fertility treatment is restricted to heterosexual
married couples"); supra text accompanying notes 24-29 (discussing the Catholic
directives banning reproductive technologies and prohibiting unmarried couples
from undergoing fertility treatment).
36 See William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations upon
Autonomous Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POLVY 455, 457 (2001).
37 Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the
Emerging Health Care Market, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1429, 1505 (1995).
" Bassett, supra note 36, at 458-59.
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Further complicating access to fertility treatment, some
state conscience clause provisions have allowed health insurance
companies to avoid covering fertility services that are against the
company's religious or moral beliefs. 39 Twelve states, however,
require that insurers cover infertility treatment.4 °

II. MAPPING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIENCE CLAUSES
A.

An Analysis of State and Federal Conscience Clauses

This Section discusses the history of conscience clauses and
tracks their expanding scope of protection. A conscience clause,
also referred to as a "refusal clause," "refers to any statute or
regulation providing explicit protection for the rights of health
care providers to decline to provide or participate in providing
health services that violate their religious or moral beliefs.'
The depth and scope of protection afforded by these clauses
varies greatly among the states. 42 The flexibility states have in
drafting their conscience clauses is a result of these provisions
being "neither constitutionally mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause, nor constitutionally forbidden by the Establishment
Clause."43 These clauses can protect employees who decline to
provide abortions, sterilizations, and other enumerated
procedures from firing, demotion, and professional sanctions.
They can also protect "religious hospitals and health care
institutions from any obligation to perform the contested

39 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3 (2008). This provision is the broadest
example of a state conscience clause providing protection for health insurance
institutions.
40 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE

LEGISLATURES,

INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR INFERTILITY TREATMENT,

STATE LAWS RELATED TO

http://www.ncsl.org/programs/

healthI50infert.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2009) (summarizing state statutes
requiring insurance coverage for either infertility treatment or in vitro fertilization);
see, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6 (West 2008) (requiring insurers to provide
coverage for infertility treatments).
41 Lynn D. Wardle, Protectingthe Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers,
14 J. LEGAL MED. 177, 178 (1993).
42 See Martha S. Swartz, "Conscience Clauses" or "Unconscionable Clauses":
PersonalBeliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POLy L. &
ETHICS 269, 284-86 (2006).
43Id. at 327.
4LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, LAW AND RELIGION 114 (Foundation Press 2007).
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service."4 5 Additionally, they can shield health care facilities and
individual health care practitioners from liability due to lawsuits
by patients.4 6
Conscience clauses were first enacted at the state and
federal levels following Roe v. Wade,47 the United States Supreme
Court decision holding that a woman's decision to undergo an
abortion is constitutionally protected by the right to privacy, 48
and Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital,49 the district court decision
that ordered a Catholic hospital to perform a tubal ligation in
violation of its Catholic directives. 0 Following Taylor and the
resulting debate over whether receipt of federal funds required
the recipients of such funds to provide abortions or sterilizations,
Congress passed the Church Amendment to the Health Programs
Extension Act of 1973, declaring that a hospital that receives
federal funding is not a state actor.5 ' Under this provision, the
court could not order a hospital that receives federal funding to
"make its facilities available for the performance of any
sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance of such
procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited by the entity
on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions."52 The
" Id. at 114.
" Should Conscience Be Your Guide? Exploring Conscience-Based Refusals in
Health Care, L. & HEALTH CARE NEWSL., Fall 2006, at 12, 13. These types of
conscience clauses are often referred to as "horizontal conscience clauses" because
they protect health care facilities and individual health care practitioners from suit
by patients. Id. Conscience clauses that protect health care providers from coercion
by the government or employers are often referred to as "vertical conscience
clauses." Id.
47 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 Id. at 154.
4 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), affd, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 948 (1976).
50 Id. at 949-51. The plaintiff requested a sterilization procedure during her
cesarean section, but St. Vincent's Hospital refused her request because it violated
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals. Id. at 949. The patient
and her husband claimed that their constitutional rights were violated and sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that because the hospital received federal funding
to help pay for its construction under the Hill-Burton Act, the hospital was a state
actor. Id. Congress responded by passing the Church Amendment to the Health
Programs Extension Act of 1973, allowing the district court to declare that the
hospital was not a state actor and thereby refuse jurisdiction. Id. at 950.
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006). This amendment allowed the district court in
Taylor to dissolve the injunction against St. Vincent's Hospital because the hospital
was no longer a state actor. See Taylor, 369 F. Supp. at 950.
52 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(2)(A). The second conscience provision in the Church
Amendments prohibits an employer who receives certain federal funding from
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Church Amendment's protection was expanded in 1974 to include
protection for religious or moral objections to perform any health
service in which a hospital received funds from the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare.53
In addition to conscience clauses promulgated by the federal
government that imposed restrictions on facilities as conditions
to receive federal funding, 54 most states enacted conscience
clauses to provide additional protection for their citizens. Many
religious groups, including Catholics, Mormons, Seventh-Day
Adventists, Baptists, and Muslims, morally objected to abortions
and demanded conscience clauses at the state level to protect
health care providers' rights to freely exercise their religions by
shielding them from liability or discriminatory treatment for
refusing to perform abortions. 5
Forty-five states adopted
conscience clauses in response to these demands for greater
religious protection.5 6 While some states limited their conscience
clauses to abortion,57 other states also included sterilization
procedures. 8

discriminating against a physician or other health care personnel for either
performing a lawful sterilization procedure or abortion or refusing to perform these
procedures because of his or her religious or moral convictions. See id. § 300a-7(c)(1).
Another provision in the Church Amendments prohibits any entity that receives
certain federal funding from discriminating against, "any applicant (including
applicants for internships and residencies) for training or study because of the
applicant's reluctance, or willingness, to counsel, suggest, recommend, assist, or in
any way participate in the performance of abortions or sterilizations contrary to or
consistent with the applicant's religious beliefs or moral convictions." Id. § 300a-7(e).
The Act also prohibits discrimination against health care personnel who refuse to
perform any lawful health service or research activity funded by the Department of
Health and Human Services because it is contrary to his or her religious beliefs or
moral convictions. Id. § 300a-7(c)(2).
13 See id. § 300a-7(d).
' See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing federal conscience
clauses).
"

GRIFFIN, supra note 44, at 115.

56 Id.

Alabama, Vermont, New Hampshire, West Virginia, and Mississippi are
the five states that did not enact conscience clauses in response to these events. Id.
Of note, some of these states, such as Mississippi, later adopted a conscience clause
provision. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5 (2008) (enacted 2004). New Mexico
and Oregon had conscience clauses for "therapeutic abortions" prior to Roe v. Wade.
See N.M. STAT. § 30-5-2 (2009) (enacted 1969); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485 (2008)
(enacted 1969).
" See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 333.20182 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.475
(2008).
58 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1
(West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11
(2008).
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After the early 1970s, the scope of conscience clauses
continued to expand due to three factors impacting the health
care system. First, in the mid-1970s, state legislatures reacted to
a public outcry for living wills in response to the case of Karen
Quinlan 9 and began passing the "Natural Death Acts."6 °
Included in many of these Acts are provisions permitting health
care providers to forego complying with a patient's health care
decision regarding end of life care if it is "contrary to the
individual provider's sincerely held religious beliefs or sincerely
held moral convictions."6 1 Second, in the mid-1990s, a second
wave of conscience clauses was prompted by the Clinton
Administration's promise of universal health coverage that would
afford individuals a right to a basic set of health care services."
Religiously affiliated health care systems sought protection to
avoid being required to provide some of the services included in
the proposal.6
Although the push for universal health coverage
failed and American citizens-who are not inmates in the federal
prison system-have no federal right to health care coverage,'
the debate over conscience clauses remains.
The third factor creating the push to expand the scope of
conscience clauses was the Supreme Court decision of
Employment Division v. Smith, 5 which eroded the ability of
health care providers to claim a religious exemption for refusing
to treat a patient based upon a First Amendment freedom of

59 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 651 (N.J. 1976) (noting that the issue before
the court involved parents of a woman in a persistent vegetative state seeking
discontinuance of all medical procedures sustaining her life).
60 These provisions allowed individuals to prepare living wills that directed their
care providers regarding their desired end-of-life wishes. See Swartz, supra note 42,
at 282.
61

W. VA. CODE § 16-30-12(b) (2008); see also ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060(e) (2008);

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:7(II) (2008).
62 CATHERINE
WEISS
RELIGIOUS
REFUSALS

ET. AL.,
AND

ACLU REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS
1

PROJECT,
(2002),

http://www.aclu.org(FilesPDFs/ACF911.pdf.
63 Id.
See Patsner, supra note 3, at 3.
494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (establishing that a neutral law of general
applicability would not be struck down as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause
unless a "hybrid" claim was asserted); see infra text accompanying notes 139-141
(discussing the Smith case and "hybrid" claims).
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religion claim.66 With less constitutional protection, religious
organizations sought additional statutory protection from their
state legislatures.
Currently, almost every state has enacted a conscience
clause that covers abortion or sterilization procedures,6 7 and
many include services related to contraception.6" Other types of
treatment included in state conscience clauses include assisted
reproduction,6 9 euthanasia, 70 and termination of life support. 1
Many conscience clauses provide protection for health care
providers and not just physicians.72 The broadest category of
conscience clauses, which permit health care providers to refuse
to participate in any type of health care procedure, has fueled the
most debate.73 To appreciate the true scope of these conscience
Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
See GU2rrMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REFUSING To
PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICES 1, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib
_RPHS.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2009) (delineating the state policies allowing
providers to refuse to perform certain services and noting that, "46 states allow some
health care providers to refuse to provide abortion services," and "17 states allow
some health care providers to refuse to provide sterilization services").
68 Id. ("13 states allow some health care providers to refuse to provide services
related to contraception.").
69 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (West 2009) ("A person may
not be required to perform or participate in, or refer to any source for, any medical
procedure that results in artificial insemination, sterilization, or termination of
pregnancy.").
70 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (West 2009) ("No pharmacist may be
required to dispense medication if there is reason to believe that the medication
would be used to ...[clause the death of any person by means of an assisted suicide,
euthanasia, or mercy killing.").
71 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:7(II) (2008).
72 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(a) (West 2009) (including
within the protective scope of its conscience clause "a physician, a registered nurse, a
licensed vocational nurse, or any other person employed or with staff privileges at a
hospital, facility, or clinic"). Many state conscience clauses have expanded from
permitting only individual providers from refusing to provide a service to permitting
an institution or insurer to refuse to provide a service based on a religious or moral
belief. See Rachel Benson Gold & Adam Sonfield, Refusing To Participatein Health
Care: A Continuing Debate, 3 GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y, Feb. 2000, at 8, 9,
availableat http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/1/grO31O8.pdf.
11 See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3(a) (2008) (defining health care to include
"any phase of patient care, including but not limited to, testing; diagnosis; prognosis;
ancillary research; instructions; family planning, counseling, referrals, or any other
advice in connection with the use or procurement of contraceptives and sterilization
or abortion procedures; medication; or surgery or other care or treatment rendered
by a physician or physicians, nurses, paraprofessionals or health care facility,
intended for the physical, emotional, and mental well-being of persons"); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 41-107-3(a) (2008) (permitting refusal for "any phase of patient medical care,
66

67
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clauses, an examination of what constitutes a religious or moral
objection is required.
B.

Defining a Religious or Moral Objection

States differ as to what is required to justify a religious or
moral refusal to provide medical treatment, prompting critics to
call them "refusal statutes." 4 As of 1993, more than one-third of
the jurisdictions in the United States did not define what
constituted an acceptable conscientious objection. 5 Many states
require no explanation as to why the health care provider refuses
to participate in treatment. v West Virginia's conscience clause
pertaining to end-of-life treatment raises the bar and requires a
"sincerely held religious belief[]" or a "sincerely held moral
conviction[]. 77 While some states like New York and South
Carolina require written notice of the moral or religious
objection, only New York requires that the reasons for the
objection be included in the notice, whereas South Carolina does
not.78

treatment or procedure, including, but not limited to, the following: patient referral,
counseling, therapy, testing, diagnosis or prognosis, research, instruction,
prescribing, dispensing or administering any device, drug, or medication, surgery, or
any other care or treatment rendered by health care providers or health care
institutions"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.47.160 (West 2009) ("No individual
health care provider, religiously sponsored health carrier, or health care facility may
be required by law or contract in any circumstances to participate in the provision of
or payment for a specific service if they object to so doing for reason of conscience or
religion. No person may be discriminated against in employment or professional
privileges because of such objection.").
74 See Swartz, supra note 42, at 292-93.
75 See id.
76See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b) (2008) (stating "[n]othing in this section
requires a hospital or person to participate in an abortion"); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2009) (declaring that "[nlo person shall be required to
perform or assist in the performance of an abortion or sterilization").
77 See W. VA. CODE. § 16-30-12 (2008).
78 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i(1) (McKinney 2008) (stating that "any
person... may refuse to perform or assist in such abortion by filing a prior written
refusal setting forth the reasons therefor with the appropriate and responsible
hospital, person, firm, corporation or association"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50(a)
(2008) (instructing that notice of objection "will suffice without specification of the
reason therefor").
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III. NORTH COAST WOMEN'S CARE MEDICAL GROUP, INC. V. SAN
DIEGO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT: A CLASH BETWEEN THE
FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS

The problem this Note addresses-the conflict between a
health care provider's right to refuse to provide medical
treatment based on a religious or moral belief and a patient's
ability to access fertility treatment without facing sexual
orientation discrimination-is exemplified in a recent Supreme
Court of California case, North Coast Women's Care Medical
Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior Court.7 9 North Coast
was decided without reference to California's conscience clause
because, unlike other states such as Mississippi" and Illinois,8 '
which afford health care providers broad statutory immunity for
refusing to provide any type of medical treatment based on a
provider's religious or moral belief, California's conscience clause
only insulates health care providers from liability for refusing to
perform abortions8 2 and was inapplicable to a case involving
fertility treatment. The case, therefore, demonstrates the level of
constitutional protection afforded to physicians at a secular
group medical practice when their conscience refusal falls outside
the protective scope of a state conscience clause. As elaborated
upon in Part V.A.3 of this Note, the outcome of this case would be
the same if the legislative recommendations set forth in Part V
are adopted by state legislatures because the suggested statutory
provision excludes from its protective scope health care
practitioners who work for a secular group medical practice and
refuse to provide a fertility treatment because of a patient's
sexual orientation.
A.

The Case of Guadalupe Benitez

In North Coast, a patient, Guadalupe Benitez, sued North
Coast Women's Care Medical Group ("North Coast") and two of
its physicians, Drs. Brody and Fenton, for damages and
injunctive relief, claiming that she was discriminated against
and refused infertility treatment based on her sexual

19 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
80 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(2) (2008).
81See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2 (2008).
82 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(a) (West 2008).
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orientation-a violation of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. 3
Defendants asserted as an affirmative defense their rights of
freedom of religion and free speech under federal and state
constitutions.8 4 The Supreme Court of California held that these
defenses would not exempt the defendants from complying with
the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibits sexual orientation
discrimination. 5
Ms. Benitez was a lesbian woman who lived with her
partner, Joanne Clark. 6 After deciding that they wanted to raise
a family, Ms. Benitez began performing intravaginal selfinsemination, "a nonmedical process in which a woman inserts
sperm into her own vagina""' using sperm from a sperm bank. 8
After intravaginal self-insemination proved unsuccessful, 8 9 she
sought fertility treatment at defendant North Coast.9 ° North
Coast was selected as a treatment facility because it was covered
under Ms. Benitez's employee health plan.9 1 Ms. Benitez notified
defendant Dr. Christine Brody, an obstetrician and gynecologist,
during their first patient-physician meeting that Ms. Benitez was
a lesbian.92 Dr. Brody informed Ms. Benitez and her partner that
intrauterine insemination ("IUI")93 might become necessary if
Ms. Benitez wanted to conceive.94 Allegedly, Dr. Brody also

I N. Coast, 189 P.3d at 964. Although the Unruh Civil Rights Act did not
expressly list sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for discrimination during the
relevant time period from 1999-2000, the court noted that "California's reviewing
courts had, in a variety of contexts, described the Act as prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination." Id. at 965. The Unruh Civil Rights Act was later
amended to expressly include marital status and sexual orientation as protected
groups. See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 636, 643 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), rev'd, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
84 N. Coast, 189 P.3d at 964. California's Constitution provides in part, "Free
exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are
guaranteed." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
. Coast, 189 P.3d at 970.

5

Id. at 963.
87 Id.

Id.
Ms. Benitez "was diagnosed with polycystic ovarian syndrome, a disorder
characterized by irregular ovulation." Id.
88
89

90 Id.

9' N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d
636, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), rev'd, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
92 N. Coast, 189 P.3d at 963.
9' IUI occurs when a physician inserts semen into a women's uterus via a
catheter that is threaded through a patient's cervix. Id.
9 Id.
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stated that her religious beliefs would preclude her from
performing this procedure on Ms. Benitez because Ms. Benitez
was a lesbian.9 5 Importantly, there was a factual dispute over
whether Dr. Brody refused to perform the IUI because Ms.
Benitez was unmarried (as Dr. Brody claimed) or because Ms.
Benitez was a lesbian (as Ms. Benitez claimed).9 6 This dispute
was significant because at the time of the alleged discrimination,
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination
based on sexual orientation, but it did not prohibit discrimination
based on marital status.97 Dr. Brody was, however, willing to
provide other obstetrical and gynecological care aside from IUI.98
According to Dr. Brody, she informed Ms. Benitez that two other
physicians in her practice, Drs. Stoopack and Langley, did not
hold the same religious beliefs and would be willing to perform
the IUI procedure on Ms. Benitez if she required the procedure to
become pregnant. 99 According to Ms. Benitez, however, Dr.
Brody informed her that "'all other members of her practicewhom she believed lacked her bias-would be available'" to
perform the IUI. 100
Ms. Benitez continued to receive fertility treatment with Dr.
Brody. 10 1 Eventually, IUI became the next step in the treatment
plan. 102 Due to a miscommunication among the North Coast
physicians over the type of procedure Ms. Benitez desired, Dr.
Fenton ultimately referred Ms. Benitez to an outside physician so
she could receive IUI treatment-he did not believe that any
capable physician at North Coast would be willing to perform the
desired procedure on Ms. Benitez because it would violate their

Id. at 963 & n.1.
96 Id. at 963 n.1.
97 Id.
91 See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. Rptr.
3d 636, 639 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), rev'd, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
99 N. Coast, 189 P.3d at 963.
100Id.
101 Id. During this period of continued treatment, Ms. Benitez received Clomid
(an ovulation-inducing medicine), had a hysterosalpingiogram to determine if her
fallopian tubes were blocked, and underwent a diagnostic laparoscopy surgical
procedure to evaluate her for potential endometriosis. Id. "'Endometriosis is a
condition in which tissue similar to the lining of the uterus' occurs on the ovaries,
the fallopian tubes, or elsewhere in the body. Between [thirty] and [forty] percent of
women with this condition may suffer from infertility." Id. at 963 n.2.
102 Id. at 963-64.
95
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firmly held religious or moral beliefs. 10 3 This refusal to treat was
not only emotionally troubling for Ms. Benitez but also
financially troubling because the treatment she received under
the care of her new physician was not covered by her insurance
policy. 10 4 Her financial concerns were mitigated, however, after
her insurance company made an exception and allowed her to
receive treatment with an out-of-network provider.10 5
Ms. Benitez moved for summary adjudication on defendant's
10 6
affirmative defense of constitutional free exercise of religion.
The trial court granted summary adjudication, "ruling that
neither the federal nor the state Constitution provides a religious
defense to a claim of sexual orientation discrimination under
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act." 107 The court limited the
adjudication of plaintiffs claim to sexual orientation
discrimination, allowing the defendants to offer evidence at trial
that the physicians refused to treat Ms. Benitez on other
The defendants appealed the
grounds, such as marital status.'
decision to the court of appeals, where the motion was denied on
the grounds that summary adjudication was improper because
there was a dispute over a material issue of fact-whether Ms.
Benitez was refused treatment by North Coast physicians
because of her sexual orientation or her marital status' 0 9-and
granting the motion would, therefore, be contrary to the
statutory requirements for summary adjudication because it did
not completely dispose of the affirmative defense." 0
The case was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court of
California, where the issue was framed as whether "the rights of
religious freedom and free speech, as guaranteed in both the
federal and the California Constitutions, exempt a medical
103 Id. Dr. Brody did make a notation that Ms. Benitez opted for the sperm bank
sperm instead of the fresh sperm, but this documentation was placed in Dr. Brody's
inbox, instead of Ms. Benitez's medical chart, by Dr. Brody's secretary who was
awaiting Dr. Brody's return from vacation. Id. As a result of this, Dr. Fenton was
unaware of this information. Id.
'o See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. Rptr.
3d 636, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), rev'd, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
105Id. Ms. Benitez ultimately became pregnant using in vitro fertilization while

under the care of the out-of-network provider. Id.
106 N. Coast, 189 P.3d at 962-63.
107 Id. at 964.
108 Id. at 968.
100 N. Coast, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 647-48.
11 See N. Coast, 189 P.3d at 962-63.
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clinic's physicians from complying with the California Unruh
Civil Rights Act's prohibition against discrimination based on a
person's sexual orientation.""'
The court answered with a
unanimous "no""' and held that the defendants' "constitutional
rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion [did not]
exempt them from complying with the Unruh Civil Rights Act's
prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination." 113 The
defendants remained free to present evidence at trial that their
religious objection was based on Ms. Benitez's marital status as a
14
single woman and not her sexual orientation.
The concurring opinion suggested in dicta that if the
defendant was a sole practitioner, rather than a group medical
practice, the physician's right of religion may outweigh the
5
state's interest in preventing sexual orientation discrimination."
The outcome should be different because requiring the sole
practitioner to provide treatment against his religious or moral
beliefs would not be the means "'least restrictive' on religion of
furthering the state's legitimate interest," "[a]t least where the
patient could be referred with relative ease and convenience to
another practice."" 6
B.

ConstitutionalChallenges to the Free Exercise of Religion

In determining the appropriate scope of state conscience
clauses, an in-depth examination of the religious protections
afforded by the First Amendment is necessary.
The First
Amendment is often the source of religious protection afforded to
health care providers in states where the scope of the state's
conscience clause does not include protection for refusals to
perform the type of treatment at issue." 7 This Section will
. Id. at 962.
112 Id.
11 Id. at 970. In rejecting defendants' claimed violation of their right to free
speech, the court determined that "[Ms. Benitez's] conduct as complained of by
defendants does not fall within the ambit of the First Amendment." Id. at 968.
114 Id. at 970.
"5 Id. at 971 (Baxter, J., concurring).
"-s See id.
11 See
id. at 968-69 (implementing the First Amendment constitutional
standard to determine the level of protection the California Constitution provided
because there was no standard set forth by the state). Of note, some state
constitutions may be additional sources of protection for right of religion claims;
however, that discussion is beyond the scope of this Note. For a more complete
discussion of state constitutions as sources of religious protection, see Michael W.
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discuss how the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the First Amendment right of religion in determining whether
this constitutional right should prevail when it conflicts with
state law.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides
that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."1l '
This
provision is applicable to the states by its incorporation into the
Fourteenth Amendment." 9 "The free exercise of religion means,
first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever
religious doctrine one desires .,"120
This prohibits "any
governmental regulation of religious beliefs."' 2'
An individual's right to perform or to refuse certain physical
acts of religion is treated differently than an individual's right to
believe: The right to believe is always constitutional, while the
right to perform or refuse to perform physical acts of religion
must withstand additional analysis to determine whether the act
is constitutionally protected. 1 22 The Supreme Court elaborated
on this principle and asserted in Reynolds v. United States 23 that
"['aws are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices."'2 4
Laws that restrict physical acts
performed or objected to because of a religious belief are divided
into two categories: "valid and neutral law[s] of general
applicability, ' 125 where the prohibition of the exercise of religion
is "but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise127valid provision, 12' and laws that target the exercise of
religion.
This is an important distinction because courts treat
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1455-66 (1990).
'18 U.S. CONST. amend. I.

See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990). This case was
superseded by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, which was later invalidated by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), thereby restoring the validity of Smith on
this point of law. See also infra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
120 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
121 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
19

122 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
123 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
124 Id. at 166.
125 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (internal
126 See id. at 878.
127 See id. at 877-78.

quotation mark omitted).
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them very differently under a First Amendment analysis. State
laws that target the exercise of religion will always be
unconstitutional, 12 but neutral state laws of general applicability
are analyzed under the standard set forth in Employment
Division, Departmentof Human Resources v. Smith. 2 9
The initial standard for determining when the First
Amendment right of religion can trump a neutral law of general
applicability was set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.130 Under this
standard, a state had to show a "compelling state interest" to
justify infringing on a general law that burdens "certain overt
acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles." 13 ' A compelling
interest would not be demonstrated by "showing merely.., a
rational relationship to some colorable state interest... ; in this
highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible

limitation.'

"132

Under the "compelling interest" standard established in
Sherbert, the Court held that it was a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause to require a Seventh-Day Adventist to abandon
her religious convictions and work on Saturday, her Sabbath, in
order to be eligible for state unemployment benefits. 133 The
Court considered three factors in its analysis: (1) whether the
restriction imposed on the employee impinged on her free
exercise of religion; (2) whether the restriction served a
compelling state interest; and (3) whether the restriction was
sufficiently tailored to minimize the intrusion on the employee's
First Amendment right of religion. 134 Applying these factors, the
Court determined that the unemployment ineligibility provision
impermissibly impinged on the employee's right to exercise her
religion freely, even though it did so indirectly.' 13
After

Id.
See id. at 876-79 (describing the standard used for assessing the
constitutionality of neutral state laws).
130 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). A discussion of this earlier "compelling interest"
standard set forth by the Court in Sherbert is important for understanding the
subsequent case discussions in Part D of this Section.
131 See id. at 403 (internal quotation mark omitted).
132Id. at 406 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945)).
133 Id. at 409-10.
134See id. at 403, 406-07.
135Id. at 403-04.
128
129
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establishing that there was no compelling state 136
interest, the
court ruled that the provision was unconstitutional.
The level of First Amendment protection afforded to
individuals under the Sherbert standard was diminished in
Smith. 137 Following Smith, for an individual who is charged with
violating a "neutral, generally applicable law" successfully to
assert a Free Exercise Clause defense, they must assert a
"hybrid" claim, meaning that they must assert another
constitutional protection in conjunction with the Free Exercise
Clause in order to prevail. 138 For example, a hybrid claim can
prevail if a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is demonstrated
in conjunction with a violation of free speech or freedom of the
press.139 The state, however, is not required to provide religious
accommodations for neutral laws of general
applicability that do
40
not infringe on other constitutional rights.1
Although the ruling in Smith limited the amount of
constitutional protection afforded under a right of religion claim
against a neutral law of general applicability, the Court
expressly noted that because an action is not constitutionally
protected, it does not follow that the act is undesirable or should
not be permitted.'
Instead, the Court noted that religious
accommodation should be left to the political process.
In Smith, the claimants failed to assert a hybrid claim as a
defense to a neutral law of general applicability; therefore, the
First Amendment Free Exercise Clause did not excuse the
claimants from violating a controlled substance law.'
The
claimants in Smith were two employees who applied for and were
refused unemployment benefits with Oregon's Employment
Division after they were fired from a drug rehabilitation
organization for ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for
Id. at 410; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (upholding
Amish parents' First Amendment right of religion defense to excuse them from
complying with a compulsory school attendance law that required all children to
attend public or private school until the age of sixteen because the schooling
requirement was against the parents' religious beliefs and the state's interest did
not carry sufficient weight to justify infringing on the Amish's religious beliefs).
137 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
138 See id. at 881-82.
'3

See id. at 881.

140 See id. at 882.
1

Id. at 890.

141 See id.
1

Id. at 882.
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sacramental purposes at a religious ceremony at their Native
American Church.'
Their unemployment benefits were refused
because the firing was classified as "work-related 'misconduct' "145
ingestion of peyote violated Oregon's controlled substance law.
The Court concluded that Oregon's controlled substance law was
a neutral law of general applicability. 146 Based upon this
conclusion, and the failure of the employees to assert a hybrid
claim, the Court determined that the employees' right of religion
did not provide protection for violating Oregon's controlled
substance law,
and therefore, no religious accommodation was
47
necessary.1
In response to Smith and in an effort to increase the amount
of religious protection, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") in an attempt to reinstate
Sherbert's "compelling interest" standard. 48 Congress's findings,
set forth in the Act, acknowledged that in Smith the United
States Supreme Court "virtually eliminated the requirement that
the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by
laws neutral toward religion" and asserted that "the compelling
interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests."'4 9
The United States Supreme Court, in City of Boerne v.
Flores,' ruled that RFRA was unconstitutional, at least in its
application to state and local law, because the Act violated the
separation of powers doctrine.' 5 ' Court precedent, as established
in Smith, was declared the proper framework for analyzing a
freedom of religion claim. 2 Justice O'Connor, however, in her

14 Id. at 874.

Id. at 874-75.
14'See id. at 878, 880.
147Id. at 882.
14'Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
141 (107 Stat.) at 1488.
150 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
151Id. at 536. Separation of powers is a doctrine that allocates government
authority between the three branches of the federal government. See CALVIN
MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 333 (2d ed.
2005).
152 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 536.
145

20091

RELIGIOUSLY BASED DISCRIMINATION

1001

dissenting opinion in City of Boerne, asserted that Smith's
interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause was incorrect and
15 3
should be reexamined.
As these cases demonstrate, the United States Supreme
Court has essentially removed any constitutional protection
under the Free Exercise Clause for individuals who violate a
neutral law of general applicability. This is because the Smith
standard requires an individual to successfully demonstrate a
hybrid claim to receive protection; therefore, the individual could
just assert the other constitutional protection claim and prevail
without even asserting a Free Exercise claim.
C. Relevant AntidiscriminationLaws
The right of lesbian or gay individuals to be free from
discrimination based on their sexual orientation is protected, if at
all, by state or municipal statutes. Both the Civil Rights Act of
19641 and the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 155
provide a federal remedy for discrimination, but neither
15 6
provision prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.
States and municipalities, however, are increasingly adding
sexual orientation provisions to their civil rights acts to protect
homosexual individuals against discrimination in places of public
accommodation. 157 8 At least fifteen states now prohibit this type
of discrimination.15
As the need to protect lesbians from discrimination based on
their sexual orientation is increasingly being recognized by states
as a compelling interest, the question becomes how states with
11 Id. at 544-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
154 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a2000h-6 (2006)).
15 Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438
(2006)).
1' See id. (failing to include a provision within the statute covering
discrimination based on sexual orientation); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,
99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that the Civil Rights Act does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403,
414 (D. Mass. 2002) (same).
157 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98
(2008); MINN. STAT. § 363A.02 (2008); N.Y. CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (2008);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2008).
158 See John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 323, 354 & n.116 (2004) (discussing and listing
the state statutes that prohibit this type of discrimination).
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these antidiscrimination provisions will handle a violation of
these provisions when an individual asserts protection under the
First Amendment Free Exercise Clause as an affirmative
Courts applying the earlier Sherbert "compelling
defense.
interest standard" and the currently applied Smith test have
split on this issue.5 9
D. How Courts Have Balanced the Right of Religion Against
DiscriminationClaims in Other Settings
An analysis of how states have balanced their governmental
interest in avoiding sexual orientation or marital status
discrimination vis-h-vis their interest in protecting an
individual's right of religion in other practice areas 160 is helpful in
considering the scope of statutory protection that states should
afford health care providers under their conscience clauses
because it demonstrates the relative value that courts have
assigned to these interests. The fields of employment and
property law provide an interesting comparison.
1.

Employment Law

In the setting of employment law, courts have consistently
upheld a right of religion defense against a sexual orientation
claim when the defendant is a religious organization and the
form of the relationship between the parties is religious. In
Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church of San
Francisco,161 the plaintiff sued for damages under a state statute
prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual
1'9

Compare Dignity Twin Cities v. Newman Ctr. & Chapel, 472 N.W.2d 355,

356-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that the defendant's right of religion under
the First Amendment was violated), and Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian
Church of S.F., No. 760-028, 1980 WL 4657, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1980)
(same), with Presbytery of N.J. of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Whitman, 99
F.3d 101, 103-05 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that the antidiscrimination provision did
not violate the defendant's right of religion under the First Amendment), and Gay
Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 5
(D.C. 1987) (same). The court noted in Georgetown that "[tihe District of Columbia's
interest in enforcing the Human Rights Act's prohibition of discrimination based on
sexual orientation substantially outweighs whatever burden the Act places on
Georgetown's exercise of [its] religious beliefs." 536 A.2d at 62 (Ferren, J., concurring
in part) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160 The field of medicine is not analyzed because, aside from North Coast, it does
not appear that courts have been called upon to balance these interests in that
setting.
161 No. 760-028, 1980 WL 4657 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1980).
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orientation. 162 He was fired from his position as church organist
after he disclosed to the church reverend that he was a
homosexual and refused to repent. 163 After determining that the
antidiscrimination provision was too great an infringement on
the defendant's free exercise of religion, the court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 6 1
The court,
applying a Sherbert analysis, did not find the state's interest in
preventing discrimination sufficiently compelling to overcome the
right of religion when the defendant was a religious
organization. 65 The court noted that "[fireedom of religion is so
fundamental to American history that it must be preserved even
at the expense of other rights which have become
institutionalized by the democratic process. '"166 In Presbytery of
New Jersey of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio,67
however, the court asserted that the state's interest in
preventing sexual orientation discrimination was "compelling."168
Similar to Walker, this case involved a religious organization
that claimed a provision protecting homosexuals from
discrimination impinged on its right to adhere to its
religious beliefs by preventing it from "aiding and abetting
discrimination." 6 9 Unlike in Walker, the appellants in Florio
facially challenged the New Jersey provision and claimed that it
violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. 7 °
The challenged provision prohibited discrimination based on
"affectional and sexual orientation" in employment, public
accommodations, and business dealings.17' Despite the court's

162

Id.

at *3.

16 Id. at *1.
'
165

Id. at *4.
Id.

" Id. at *5.

902 F. Supp 492 (D.N.J. 1995), affd, 99 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 521. (noting that the state of New Jersey had not only a substantial
interest, but a "compelling" interest in eliminating discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation).
167
16I

169 Id.

at 500.

Presbytery of N.J. of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Whitman, 99 F.3d
101, 103 (3d Cir. 1996). The appellants alleged that the law was unconstitutionally
overbroad and restricted their First Amendment right to free speech. Id.
171 See id. (internal quotations omitted).
170
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finding that the state had a compelling interest in preventing
sexual orientation discrimination, it opted to apply the Pullman
abstention doctrine and abdicated the obligation to decide the
case. 172
2.

Property Law

An individual's right to religious freedom and the right to be
free from discrimination often clash in property law when a
landlord refuses to rent property to an unmarried couple based
on a religious objection and claims that the First Amendment
Free Exercise Clause provides protection from liability against a
housing law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital
status.73 Courts applying the Smith analysis have consistently
rejected a landlord's right of religion as a defense to these
antidiscrimination laws because the claimed right of refusal does
not involve a hybrid constitutional claim. 1 74 Courts applying the
previous Sherbert "compelling interest" test are split as to
whether the state's interest in preventing marital status
discrimination is sufficiently compelling to defeat a right of
175
religion claim.
In one property case, Dignity Twin Cities v. Newman Center
and Chapel,76 the court upheld a defendant's right of religion
defense against a discrimination claim when the defendant was a
religious organization and refused to rent its religious facilities to
a predominately homosexual organization. 1 77
Dignity Twin
Cities, an organization mostly comprised of gay Catholics
(unaffiliated with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese), rented space
172 See id. at 107. Of note, religious organizations in New Jersey generally were
statutorily exempt from complying with the Law Against Discrimination in hiring
employees. See id. at 104. In light of the statutory protection that was already
afforded to religious organizations, the court was probably more likely to deny
religious organizations additional exemptions.
173 See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 102 P.3d 937, 946-47,
(Alaska 2004) (rejecting the landlord's claim that the discrimination law violated his
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion); Smith v. Fair Employment &
Housing Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal. 1996) (same).
174See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 921.
175 Compare Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 285
(Alaska 1994) (finding that preventing marital status discrimination was a
compelling state interest), with State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn.
1990) (finding the need to protect the right of religion "paramount" to preventing
discrimination based on marital status).
176472 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
177 Id. at 356.
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from a chapel run by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese. 78 Other
secular groups, such as Weight Watchers, also rented space from
the church. 179 After the chapel refused to renew Dignity Twin
Cities' lease because they would not sign a document stating that
they agreed with the Catholic Church's position on
homosexuality, Dignity Twin Cities filed a discrimination
complaint with the Minnesota Department of Civil Rights. 8 ° In
deciding whether the Commission Appeals Board appropriately
granted Dignity Twin Cities relief, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals noted that the outcome was dependent on whether the
relationship between the tenant renting the space and the
When the antidiscrimination
Church was religious or secular.'
provision was applied to use of the facilities by a religious
organization, the right of religion would prevail over the
antidiscrimination provision; if applied to the secular
organizations renting the church space, however, the plaintiffs
discrimination claim would prevail over the defendant's right to
religious freedom.8 2 Applying this rule to the facts of the case,
the court decided that the church's right to religious freedom
shielded it from liability against a discrimination claim because
Dignity Twin Cities was a religious organization, and state action
would constitute excessive entanglement with the church's First
Amendment right.'8 3
These cases reveal the varying level of importance that
courts have assigned to the right of religious freedom as
compared to an individual's right to be free from sexual
orientation or marital status discrimination, especially when the
When the
relationship between the parties is secular.
relationship between the parties is religious, Dignity Twin Cities
and Walker reveal the additional weight courts have afforded to
the right of religion defense over a sexual orientation
discrimination claim. The court's difficulty in balancing these

178

Id.

179

Id.

180See

id.

"IsId. at 357 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1971)).
182

See id.

183

Id.
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interests reinforces the need to ensure practitioners at least some
limited protection for conscience refusal in a fertility conscience
clause, even when the relationship between the parties is
secular.
IV. DIVERGENT POSITIONS ON CONSCIENCE REFUSAL ANALYZED
UNDER NORTH COAST WOMEN'S MEDICAL GROUP, INC. V. SAN
DIEGO SUPERIOR COURT
States currently disagree over the appropriate balance that
state conscience clauses should strike between affording
protection for an individual's right to religious freedom vis-A-vis
an individual's right to be free from discrimination.
"Legislatures have only recently begun to address this type of
[patient] selectivity based on the status of the patient rather
than on the type of procedure requested." 18 4 The divergent views
adopted by Mississippi and the American Medical Association
(AMA) as compared to Illinois emphasize the need to evaluate
how states should balance these interests.
Some provisions, like Mississippi's conscience clause and the
AMA's ethical policy, discourage physicians from discriminating
against a patient based on sexual orientation regardless of a
physician's claimed protection under the right of religion. 185 The
AMA's ethical policy, which is very similar to Mississippi's
conscience clause, describes the creation of patient-physician
relationships as contractual, whereby physicians may decline to
enter into the relationship." 6 Despite the contractual nature of
the physician-patient relationship, the AMA policy specifically
provides that "physicians who offer their services to the public
may not decline to accept patients because of race, color, religion,
national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or any other
basis that would constitute invidious discrimination."8 7 Under
this policy, it "may be ethically permissible for physicians to
decline a potential patient when... [a] specific treatment sought
by an individual is incompatible with the physician's personal,
's

See Swartz, supra note 42, at 295.

185

See MISS. CODE ANN.

§ 41-107-5

(2008); COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL

AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9.12 (2007), available at

http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/Code-ofMedEth/opinion/opinion
912.html.
11 See id.
187

Id.
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religious, or moral beliefs," but this provision is not an exception
allowing a physician to refuse to treat patients based on their
sexual orientation. 88 Thus it appears that under the AMA's
ethical guidelines, a physician may refuse to perform a fertility
treatment on any patient because of a religious or moral
objection but cannot refuse to provide fertility treatment
specifically to homosexual patients based on a personal, religious,
or moral belief-this would be discrimination based on a patient's
characteristic. 89 Presumably, it would, therefore, be permissible
under the AMA guidelines for a physician to deny fertility
treatment to a female who the physician does not morally believe
would be a suitable mother but impermissible to deny treatment
to a patient based on their sexual orientation, race, or marital
status.
The AMA's ethical policy mirrors Mississippi's conscience
clause, which provides in part:
(1) Rights of Conscience. A health care provider has the
right not to participate, and no health care provider shall be
required to participate in a health care service that violates his
or her conscience. However, this subsection does not allow a
health care provider to refuse to participate in a health care
service regarding a patient because of the patient's race, color,
national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed or sexual
orientation.
(2) Immunity from Liability. No health care provider shall
be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for declining to
participate in a health care service that violates his or her
conscience. However, this subsection does not exempt a health
care provider from liability for refusing to participate in a
health care service regarding a patient because of the patient's
race, color, national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed or
sexual orientation.190

188

COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM.

MED. ASS'N, CODE OF

MEDICAL ETHICS § 10.05 (2003), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amallpub/
upload/mm/Code of MedEth/opinion/opinionl005.html. The policy explicitly states
that refusal based on a religious belief only applies in situations that are not covered
above in opinion 9.12, forbidding a physician from accepting a patient based on his
or her sexual orientation. Id. § 10.05(b).
189 See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS §§ 9.12, 10.05(3)(c) (2007), available at http:/www.ama-assn.org/
amal/pub/upload/mm/Code-of-Med-Eth/toc.html
190 § 41-107-5.

1008

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:977

In a jurisdiction with this type of conscience clause, the
defendants in North Coast would not be protected under the right
of religion for refusing to treat patients based on their sexual
orientation; they would, however, be protected if their refusal
was based on Ms. Benitez's marital status because marital status
is not a protected class within the statute.
In contrast, other states, like Illinois, favor the right of
religion over the right to be free from sexual orientation or
marital status discrimination 91 and would afford the defendants
in North Coast statutory protection for refusing to treat Ms.
Benitez.19 2
This outcome appears likely under Illinois law
because, unlike Mississippi's conscience clause, Illinois's
conscience clause, in part, provides that:
The General Assembly finds and declares that people and
organizations hold different beliefs about whether certain
health care services are morally acceptable. It is the public
policy of the State of Illinois to respect and protect the right of
conscience of all persons who refuse to obtain, receive or accept,
or who are engaged in, the delivery of, arrangement for, or
payment of health care services and medical care whether
acting individually, corporately, or in association with other
persons; and to prohibit all forms of discrimination,
disqualification, coercion, disability or imposition of liability
upon such persons or entities by reason of their refusing to act
contrary to their conscience or conscientious convictions in
refusing to obtain, receive, accept, deliver, pay for, or arrange
93
for the payment of health care services and medical care.'
The Act explicitly states that it is intended to supersede all other
Acts inconsistent with the terms or operation of the Act.'
Therefore, although Illinois declares it public policy "[tlo secure
for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination
against any individual because of his.., sexual orientation.., in
connection with ...the availability of public accommodations," 195
its legislature clearly believes that the right of religious
freedom trumps its interest in preventing sexual orientation
discrimination in the health care setting.
19,See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2 (2008).
1'2See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego, 189 P.3d 959,
963-65 (Cal. 2008).
193 70/2 § 2.
194

See id.

195 775 ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/1-102 (2008).
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V. LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS-DISTINGUISHING AMONG
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AT SOLE PRACTITIONER PRACTICES,
GROUP MEDICAL PRACTICES, AND NON-SECULAR FACILITIES

An ideal statute would permit citizens to exercise their
religious beliefs without restrictions while also preventing
discrimination, but these interests cannot fully coexist and must,
therefore, be balanced, especially in the field of medicine.
Although the First Amendment does not constitutionally require
a religious accommodation in these circumstances, the United
States Supreme Court noted that the political process is the
appropriate sector to determine the extent to which religious
accommodations should be afforded to citizens.196
This final Section suggests that state legislatures adopt a
conscience clause that includes fertility treatment within its
scope but prohibits conscience refusal based on a patient's sexual
orientation by most, but not all, classes of heath care providers.
The suggested provision distinguishes the level of statutory
protection afforded to practitioners in a group medical practice or
a secular facility from that afforded to sole practitioners or
practitioners who work in a religiously controlled health care
facility. Under this suggested statutory framework, practitioners
working in association with a religiously controlled health care
facility would be included under the scope of the conscience
clause and would be shielded from liability for exercising a firmly
held religious or moral belief that results in sexual orientation
discrimination. Sole practitioners would also be included within
its protective scope but only when a patient can access fertility
treatment with another willing provider with relative
convenience. In contrast, practitioners who work in association
with a secular health care institution or a group medical practice
would be excluded from statutory protection and would be
limited to religious protections afforded by afforded by the federal
constitution or individual state constitutions. There are many
reasons why the level of statutory protection afforded to
practitioners working at a group medical practice or a secular
facility should be distinguished from that provided to
practitioners working at a religious hospital or as sole

" See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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practitioners. These reasons are explored in depth in Parts A
through C in a practical context after an examination of the
proposed legislation.
A suggested statutory provision 97 that incorporates these
exclusionary provisions might read as follows:
(1) Rights of Conscience. A health care provider has the
right not to perform, and no health care provider shall be
required to perform, a fertility treatment that violates his or her
conscience. This subsection does not, however, allow a group
medical practice or a secular health care facility, or a
practitioner working at such a facility, to refuse to perform a
fertility treatment on a patient because of the patient's race,
color, national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed, marital
status, gender identity, or sexual orientation. Nor does it allow
a sole practitioner to refuse to provide fertility treatment on a
patient because of the patient's race, color, national origin,
ethnicity, sex, religion, creed, marital status, gender identity, or
sexual orientation if the patient cannot be referred with relative
ease and convenience to another willing practitioner.
(2) Immunity from Liability. No health care provider shall
be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for declining to
perform a fertility treatment that violates his or her conscience.
This subsection does not, however, exempt a group medical
practice or a secular health care facility, or a practitioner
working at such a facility, from liability for refusing to perform
fertility treatment on a patient because of the patient's race,
color, national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed or sexual
orientation. Nor does it exempt a sole practitioner who refuses
to provide fertility treatment on a patient because of the
patient's race, color, national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion,
creed, marital status, gender identity, or sexual orientation if
the patient cannot be referred with relative ease and
convenience to another willing practitioner.
Definitions:
(3) "Secular Health Care Facility" means any public or
private hospital, clinic, center, medical school, medical training
institution, laboratory or diagnostic facility, infirmary,
dispensary, ambulatory surgical treatment center, or other
institution where health care services are provided and is not

governed by an express set of religious directives.

197This suggested statutory provision uses Mississippi's conscience clause as a
statutory basis. See generally MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5 (2008).
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(4) "Group Medical Practice" means a group of two or more
health care practitioners who are formally organized as a legal
entity in which business and clinical facilities, records, and
personnel are shared.19 Religious health care facilities that are
governed by an express set of religious directives are excluded
from this definition.
(5) "Sole Practitioner"means a health care practitioner not in
a group medical practice who operates independently.
A.

Applying the Proposed Statute

1.

Sole Practitioners

Under the proposed statutory provision, a health care
practitioner working as a sole practitioner may refuse to provide
fertility treatment to a lesbian patient if doing so will violate a
firmly held religious or moral belief and the health care provider,
by referring the patient, can assure the patient access to another
willing provider with relative convenience to the patient.
Applying this provision to the hypothetical scenario presented in
the introduction, where the sole practitioner was the only care
provider in the area, the physician would not be afforded
statutory protection for refusing to perform the requested
fertility treatment. She would, therefore, be subject to liability
for discrimination if she refused to perform the requested
treatment. If the defendant in North Coast, however, was a sole
practitioner, the defendant would be shielded from liability under
the proposed statute because Ms. Benitez was referred to another
willing provider with relative ease and convenience.1 99
Sole practitioners should not fall within the same protective
sphere as health care practitioners at group medical practices
because this would not be the least restrictive means that could
be employed to minimize impinging on an individual's right of
religion and avoiding discriminatory treatment. This position is
supported by Judge Baxter in his concurring opinion in North
Coast.200 Judge Baxter likely determined that there were other
198This

definition was modified from the American Medical Association's
definition of a "group medical practice" as a group of three or more health care
practitioners. STEVEN JONAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

153 (5th ed. 2003).
'9

See supra text accompanying notes 102-105.

See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego, 189 P.3d 959, 971
(Cal. 2008) (Baxter, J., concurring).
200
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less restrictive means available for a group medical practice, as
compared to a sole practitioner, because the partnership
arrangement of a group medical practice allows physicians to
seek out partners that do not share the same religious or moral
objections. The group medical practice could, therefore, ensure
patients access to fertility treatment by having at least one
willing practitioner on staff, while also avoiding any physician
requirement to perform procedures on patients that the
physician has religious or moral objections to performing.
Another reason sole practitioners warrant special protection
is because if all sole practitioners were required to perform
fertility treatment on every patient despite a religious or moral
objection, many fertility specialists with firmly held religious or
moral beliefs would likely abandon their present fertility
practices. They would choose another field of medicine where
they would not be forced to violate their religious or moral
beliefs. This could further impede a woman's ability to access
fertility treatment. This provision also allows sole practitioners
to protect their right to refuse treatment based on their religious
or moral beliefs by positioning their office near another willing
practitioner to ensure that a client denied treatment by them has
access to treatment from another provider with relative
convenience.
2.

Religious Health Care Facilities

Under the proposed statutory provision, a practitioner at a
religious facility that follows express religious directives, such as
a Catholic-run hospital governed by the Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, 2°1 is afforded
statutory protection for refusing to provide fertility treatment to
any type of patient if doing so would violate a religious directive.
If the defendants in North Coast practiced at a Catholic-run
facility, they would have been shielded from liability for sexual
orientation discrimination. This would hold true even if Ms.
Benitez was unable to access fertility treatment and had to
endure a significant burden to access treatment.

201

See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 24

(Directives Nos. 40, 41, 45, 53), available at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/directives.

shtml#partfour.
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Practitioners working at religiously controlled health care
facilities that are governed by an express set of religious
directives should be statutorily protected from refusing to
perform fertility treatment on otherwise protected classes of
patients if rendering the treatment violates the facility's religious
directives. As Dignity Twin Cities"2 suggests, this would be
considered excessive government entanglement with religion and
would violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.2 °3 To determine whether there is a violation of the
Establishment Clause, courts "examine the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited [by the provision],
the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and the religious
authority."2 °4 Court decisions from the field of property law, such
as Dignity Twin Cities, °5 evidence how in a practical sense courts
have found excessive government entanglement with religion and
upheld a First Amendment right of religion defense to a
discrimination claim when a religious based organization acted
in accordance with its religious directives and refused to rent
church space to a predominately homosexual organization.2 °6
Additionally, as Walker demonstrates, courts deciding
employment discrimination cases have found that a state's
interest in protecting a religious organization's right to religious
freedom can trump a state's interest in preventing sexual
orientation discrimination.2 °7 Crucial to the outcome of Walker
was the fact that the organization claiming protection under the
The obvious religious
Free Exercise Clause was a church. 20
nature of the church and its firmly established religious beliefs
contributed to the court's determination that the church's right to
202 See supra text accompanying notes 176-183.
203 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (establishing the Lemon

test to determine whether a statute is valid under the Establishment Clause).
204 Id.
205 See Dignity Twin Cities v. Newman Ctr. & Chapel, 472 N.W.2d 355, 356-57

(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that the defendant's right of religion under the First
Amendment was violated).
206 See supra text accompanying notes 176-183.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 161-166.
20 See Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church of S.F., No. 760-028, 1980
WL 4657, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1980) (discussing the Holy Bible's clear
position on homosexuality, the established religious beliefs of the church, and the
local and national belief that the congregation's organist is part of the worship

team).
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free exercise of religion outweighed the employee's right to be
free from sexual orientation discrimination. °9 Applying this
notion to conscience clauses, it follows that hospitals run by
religious organizations with established religious directives, such
as the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services,21 should be afforded additional religious protection
under the First Amendment as compared to secular facilities.
A beneficial effect of this statutory protection for religious
facilities is that these health care practices will serve as a safe
haven for health care practitioners with firmly held religious
beliefs. A practitioner could seek employment with a religious
orientation
to avoid liability for sexual
organization
discrimination provided that the requested treatment is against
the facility's religious directives. This would include protection
for refusing to refer a patient to another willing practitioner.
Practitioners could then practice medicine in accordance with
their strongly held religious or moral beliefs.
Theoretically, this provision would impose a significant
burden on a lesbian's ability to access fertility treatment due to
the prevalence of religiously controlled health care systems.21 1
This restriction, however, is limited in a practical sense because
many Catholic-run facilities already refuse to perform most types
of fertility treatments, not just on lesbian patients but on any
patient.21 2 Antitrust provisions, which can limit the continued
expansion of these religious health care facilities, can also curb
the negative impact of this provision on a lesbian's ability to
access treatment.2 13
Group Medical Practices and Secular Health Care Facilities
Under the proposed statutory provision, practitioners at a
group medical practice or a secular health care facility would not
receive statutory protection for providing discriminatory fertility
treatment despite a physician's right of religion defense. This
scenario would mirror the outcome of North Coast where the
3.

209

See id.

210 See supra note 24.
211
212
213

See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
See Monica Sloboda, Recent Development, The High Cost of Merging with a

Religiously-Controlled Hospital, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 140, 148-51 (2001)

(discussing legal approaches used to challenge hospital mergers in order to retain or
restore a woman's access to health services).
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court ruled that the defendants' right of religion would not shield
them from liability for refusing to treat a patient based on the
patient's sexual orientation.2 14 If, however, one of the health care
providers at North Coast was willing and able to perform the
fertility treatment Ms. Benitez requested, all the defendants
would be shielded from liability for discrimination.
Excluding group medical practices from the scope of a
fertility conscience clause still allows individual practitioners to
adhere to their religious or moral beliefs and practice medicine
while allowing patients access to care. The size of a group
medical practice is sufficiently large such that if one practitioner
within the group is unwilling to perform a fertility treatment on
a lesbian patient, the organization can ensure that another
practitioner will. This requires that physicians with religious or
moral objections seek out partners that do not share the same
religious or moral objections.
Patient autonomy and HMO considerations are driving
factors that necessitate this outcome. Patients should not pay for
medical services that they are not able to access.215 Excluding
group medical practices and secular health care facilities from
the scope of a fertility conscience clause helps to increase patient
autonomy by ensuring that patients retain sufficient ability to
select their health care practitioner and access the full range of
services offered by their HMO provider.
CONCLUSION

Society
has
a compelling
interest in preventing
discriminatory treatment of its citizens and an equally
compelling interest in allowing health care providers to practice
their profession without violating a sincerely held religious or
moral belief. Striking the appropriate balance between these
competing interests is a difficult task that requires compromise
from both sides.
Under the proposed statutory scheme, a
practical solution can be reached that helps ensure access to
fertility treatment without driving practitioners out of their
chosen fields of medicine or forcing them to violate their
214 See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego, 189 P.3d 959,
970-71 (Cal. 2008).
215 See Bassett, supra note 36, at 470 (explaining the limitations HMOs and
conscience refusals place on a patient's ability "to participate meaningfully and
freely in the religious restriction of medical choices for their care").
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consciences. Reaching an accord between these interests may
also encourage states that do not have sexual orientation
discrimination laws to adopt such provisions within a statutory
framework that provides additional religious protection for the
rights of health care practitioners. Although this balance is
suggested for the field of fertility medicine, such a statutory
scheme is readily adaptable to other controversial areas of
medicine, such as cryogenics and human cloning, where a similar
clash between antidiscrimination statutes and conscience
objections will likely arise as technological advancements create
new ethical dilemmas.

